




The	 intellectual	 landscape	 of	 the	 humanities	 has	 since	 the	 1960s	 been	
overshadowed	by	the	question	of	identity	and	difference	–	political	and	national	
identity,	 ethnic	 and	 racial	 identity,	 gender	 identity,	 and,	 in	 philosophy,	 the	
question	of	the	identity	of	the	self	and	of	the	knowing,	acting	and	desiring	subject.	
This	 is	 partly	due	 to	 the	 social,	 cultural	 and	political	 upheavals	 experienced	 in	
different	 parts	 of	 the	 globe	 at	 the	 time,	 for	 example,	 the	 movement	 of	
decolonization	 in	 Sub‐Saharan	 Africa,	 the	 Civil	 Rights	Movement	 in	 the	 US,	 or	















self,	 agency,	 and	 subjectivity	 in	 narrative	 theory,	 phenomenology,	 personal	
identity	theory,	politics,	anthropology,	 feminism,	cultural,	race	and	postcolonial	
studies.	This	book	explores	the	contemporary	effect	of	this	shift	of	perspective	in	
the	 debate	 on	 the	 self	 in	 four	 parts:	 Narrative	 Theory	 and	 Phenomenology;	
Politics,	Authenticity	and	Agency;	Feminism;	and	Race	and	the	Postcolonial.	
	
Part	 I	 of	 the	 book,	 Narrative	 Theory	 and	 Phenomenology,	 focuses	 on	 the	





out	a	real	category	 in	 the	world	and	plays	no	role	 in	 the	explanation	of	human	
nature.	 For	 more	 recent	 analytic	 philosophy,	 by	 contrast,	 personhood	 is	
recognised	as	being	crucial	for	our	social,	moral	and	cultural	life,	and	the	person	
is	regarded	as	having	intrinsic	worth.	In	addition,	recent	work	in	cognitive	science	













They	 draw	 such	 comparisons	 to	 illustrate	 their	 thesis	 that	 we	 constitute	 our	
personal	 identity	 through	 the	 narrative	 by	 which	 we	 understand	 ourselves.	
However,	there	has	been	a	surge	of	criticisms	in	the	past	decade	against	making	
such	comparisons.	 In	his	contribution	to	this	volume,	“Persons,	Characters,	and	
the	meaning	of	 ‘Narrative’’,	Alfonso	Muñoz‐Corcuera	 considers	 these	 criticisms	




a	 common	Cartesian	heritage	 concerning	 the	 transparency	of	 the	mind	or	 self‐
consciousness.	Is	it	not	the	case	that	the	self	must	know	that	it	is	deceiving	itself	
about	something?	Must	it	not	know	that	the	lie	it	tells	itself	is	a	lie?	How,	then,	is	









there	 is	 a	difference	between	 the	 ‘I’	 and	 the	 ‘self’	 and	 that	 in	order	 to	have	an	
authentic	 relationship	 to	 oneself	 this	 internal	 difference	 must	 be	 eliminated.	
Indeed,	 is	not	 authenticity	 in	 this	 sense	at	 the	heart	of	 the	political,	moral	 and	
social	 doctrine	 of	 individualism?	 It	 is	 also	 apparent	 in	 Cartesian	 rationalism,	
particularly	in	the	First	Meditation	of	the	Meditations	on	First	Philosophy	in	which	
the	reader	 is	asked	to	withdraw	from	the	authority	of	 tradition	and	that	of	 the	
senses	in	order	to	return	to	its	true	inner	self,	which	is	reason.	In	“Being	my‐self?	
Montaigne	 on	 Difference	 and	 Identity”,	 Vincent	 Caudron	 turns	 to	 Michel	 de	
Montaigne	 and	Pierre	 Charron	 to	 examine	 their	 account	 of	 authentic	 selfhood.	
Caudron	 argues	 that	 Montaigne’s	 Essays	 and	 Charron’s	 On	 Wisdom	 offer	 a	
particularly	stringent	critique	of	individualism	(and	of	Cartesianism)	in	that	the	















consciousness	 and	 first‐personal	 awareness.	 Bucelli	 argues	 that	 first‐personal	
awareness	is	already	specifically	human	inasmuch	as	it	involves	a	relation	of	self‐
reference	(or	a	sense	of	ownership)	that	does	not	entail	the	objective	notion	of	a	




Authenticity	 and	 agency,	 which	 are	 two	 particular	ways	 of	 thinking	 about	 the	
identity	of	the	self	–	whether	as	something	given	or	achieved,	as	something	natural	
or	 self‐posited	–	 are	 in	 turn	 connected	with	 the	question	of	 the	 identity	of	 the	
human	 being.	 Is	 there	 an	 ‘essence’	 to	 the	 human	 being?	 In	 other	 words,	 does	
philosophical	anthropology	have	a	stable,	 identifiable,	 invariably	fixed	object	of	
study?	 In	 “Making	 the	 Case	 for	 Political	 Anthropology:	 Understanding	 and	
Resolving	 the	 Backlash	 Against	 Liberalism”,	 Rockwell	 F.	 Clancy	 analyses	 the	
contemporary	 backlash	 against	 multiculturalism,	 cosmopolitanism	 and,	 more	
generally,	 inclusive	 liberal	 values	 –	 visible,	 for	 instance,	 in	 forms	 of	 political	
conservatism	and	religious	fundamentalism.	This	backlash,	Clancy	argues,	can	be	




of	 the	 human	 good	 in	 political	 theory?	 Clancy	 demonstrates	 that	 it	 is	 neither	
possible	 nor	 desirable.	 He	 proposes	 a	 conception	 of	 a	 philosophico‐political	
anthropology	that	develops	an	account	of	the	relations	between	the	individual	and	
the	 community	 that	 are	 characterised	 not	 by	 the	 exclusive	 particularism	 of	






Part	 III	 turns	 to	 feminism,	 the	 field	 that	 without	 doubt	 has	 been	 the	 most	
responsive	to	the	shift	of	outlook	experienced	in	the	late	60s	in	the	humanities,	








than	 of	 autonomy,	 an	 experience	 of	 our	 subjectivity	 as	 being	 in	 flux.	 In	 “The	
Decentred	Autonomous	Subject”,	Kathy	Buttersworth	considers	the	effects	of	this	
critical	 appraisal	 of	 the	 modern	 subject	 by	 post‐structuralism	 for	 feminism.	




first	 place,	 some	 post‐structuralist	 authors	 for	 whom	 the	 fragmented	 self	
constitutes	a	positive	and	normative	model	generally	tend	to	underestimate	the	
real	psychological	costs	on	people	who	suffer	 from	psychotic	disorders	such	as	
schizophrenia,	people	who	suffer	 from	a	 fragmentation	of	 self.	 It	 is	 also,	 in	 the	
second	place,	not	 always	 clear	how	such	a	model	 can	be	used	 to	 challenge	 the	
oppressive	 structures	 of	 patriarchy	 and	 capitalism.	 To	 this	 end,	 Buttersworth	
considers	Ricoeur’s	model	of	 the	subject,	which,	 she	argues,	 retains	 the	central	





Another	 key	 concern	 in	 feminist	 theory	 is	 the	 differential	 power	 of	 the	 erotic,	
understood	 as	 the	 necessary	 condition	 of	 possibility	 of	 the	 body’s	 ambiguous	
nature,	its	being	at	once	an	object	for	others	and	a	subject	for	itself.	In	“Exploring	
Rape	 as	 an	 Attack	 on	 Erotic	 Goods”,	 Louise	 du	 Toit	 argues	 that	 patriarchy	
appropriates	the	healing,	constructive,	and	liberating	power	of	the	erotic	through	
perversions	and	distortions,	 through	mystifications	and	phantasies	 such	as	 the	
idea	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 ‘overcome’	 one’s	 flesh	 in	 order	 to	 be	 an	 authentic	
subject.	Du	Toit	 considers	 this	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	question	of	what	 is	 sexual	




















In	particular,	 they	examine	 the	questioning	of	Africanness	on	 the	part	of	white	
South	Africans,	and	hence	with	the	way	white	South	Africans	have	been	dealing	




politics.	 Postcolonial	 theory	 claims	 that	 Levinas’	 deployment	 of	 alterity	
suppresses	the	materiality	and	historicity	of	social	and	political	others	and	in	so	
doing	denies	the	ethnic	and	racial	makeup	–	the	embodiment	–	of	other	identities.	
Louis	examines	Levinas’	understanding	of	alterity	and	identity	and	considers	the	
claim	that	Levinas’	philosophical	position	licenses	the	subdual	of	racial	and	ethnic	
difference.			
	
		
